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Felix Klein’s 1872 Erlangen Program has always been more famous than familiar. In
fact, Klein’s greatness lay less in his own mathematics than in his ability to recognize
and promote the best new mathematics of his time. It is natural that his program be known
for its overall vision more than for the particulars.
The program grew from many sources including Plücker’s projective geometry, Lie’s
symmetry groups, Clebsch on algebraic invariants, and the rise of topology under the name
analysis situs. Projective geometry and invariant theory faded from prominence over the
next decades while topology, Lie groups, and wider ideas of symmetry and transformation
exploded, notably encouraged by general relativity and quantum mechanics.
The high opinion of Klein’s program today reflects that later trend. And this is entirely
fair. Klein never suggested limiting geometry to the methods he knew. He called attention
to the rise and the unity of a broad family of great new methods; and he had a synoptic
vision of those methods far ahead of anyone else.
Eilenberg and Mac Lane gave a nice historical nod in 1945 in their first paper on general
category theory, saying “This may be regarded as a continuation of Klein’s Erlanger
Programm, in the sense that a geometrical space with its group of transformations is
generalized to a category with its algebra of mappings” (quoted on p. 9). People have
wondered ever since precisely what they meant, and Marquis makes that the start for a
wide-ranging reflection on category theory.
Marquis has achieved two things. One is a very interesting history and philosophy of
category theory accessible to readers with little knowledge of category theory yet valuable
to anyone interested in the subject. The other is to open several lines of inquiry into just
how category theory relates to Klein’s program. The upshot gives Klein no very specific
role in fact. Marquis argues that Eilenberg and Mac Lane “did not extend Klein’s program
as such, although they clearly made an effort to extend a part of it” (p. 4), and even this
claim must be qualified since “the connection with Klein’s program probably came as an
afterthought” (p. 66). Most precisely he puts his “central claim” this way: “with hindsight
one can argue that Klein’s program is one very special case of the power, richness, and
persuasiveness of categorical methods” (p. 3).
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studied in Göttingen in 1932–33 when the Mathematics department was still very much
Klein’s creation. He heard lectures by Hilbert and Noether who both became prominent
under Klein’s aegis and came to Göttingen on his initiative. Eilenberg’s work in algebraic
topology already in the 1930s meant he studied the work of several students of Noether.
Marquis especially emphasizes the geometric motivations for much of category theory
and the in-some-ways geometric nature of categories themselves. It is a commonplace of
history of mathematics to say that geometry went out of fashion in the 20th century.
The usual evidence cited is the absence of geometry from Bourbaki’s Elements of
Mathematics, and a claim that Bourbaki helped shift mathematics education in France
away from geometry. But at the same time Bourbaki members did a huge amount of
geometry themselves. As a notable example André Weil generalized the Gauss–Bonnet the-
orem (relating the total curvature of a surface to its topology) so elegantly and so greatly as
to produce the subject of connections on fiber bundles now central to quantum field theory.
Weil’s work extended El´ie Cartan’s geometry of group actions on spaces which Marquis
discusses at length as a 20th century successor to Klein’s program. These ideas spread all
over differential geometry and mathematical physics. Several members of Bourbaki, includ-
ing Weil and then Grothendieck, brought geometric methods into number theory culminat-
ing (so far) in arithmetic algebraic geometry.
The geometrization of physics and number theory have been prestigious archetypes of
20th century mathematics since the opening of the century with Poincaré and Hilbert;
through mid-century with Lefschetz, Weyl, and von Neumann (besides those named
above); and beyond the century’s end with Witten and the Langland’s program. These
geometrizations were and still are major sources of category theory and today their tools
are pervasively categorical. Marquis’s last chapter describes how even logic has been
geometrized using related tools. This book should go a long way to dispel the idea that
geometry was out of fashion in the 20th century.
Marquis gives no concise statement of the goal of the Erlangen program and this is quite
reasonable. Klein himself did not pose a goal. He described an array of then-recent results
in geometry which he organized around this “general problem”:
Given a manifoldness and a group of transformations of the same; to investigate the con-
ﬁgurations belonging to the manifoldness with regard to such properties as are not
altered by the transformations of the group. [1893, p. 218]
For a familiar example of transformation groups, two figures are congruent in the
Euclidean plane if one can be carried over to the other by rigidly translating, rotating, or
reflecting the plane. So the transformation group of Euclidean plane congruence-geometry
is the group of translations, rotations, and reflections. On the other hand, two figures are
similar if one can be carried over to the other by rigidly translating, rotating, reflecting,
or scaling up or down. So the transformation group of Euclidean plane similarity-geometry
is the group of all translations, rotations, reflections, and scalings. The geometries can be
studied in terms of their transformation groups.
Marquis illustrates Klein’s point that apparently different geometries can have the same
transformation group. He gives a “philosophical fable” in which three mathematicians
study apparently different geometries: one geometry of circles in the plane, one of great
circles on a sphere, and one of the complex projective plane. These are “visually” different,
so to speak, but Marquis shows how they all have “the same” transformation group and in
that sense they are merely different ways of looking at the “same” geometry. All problems
Book Reviews / Historia Mathematica 39 (2012) 460–479 477in any one of these geometries can be solved by translating them into any of the others and
solving them there.
Focus on transformation groups had been brilliantly successful in non-Euclidean geom-
etry. Klein and others showed that Euclidean, hyperbolic, and spherical plane geometry are
sub-geometries of projective plane geometry in the sense that the transformation group of
each is a subgroup of the symmetries of the projective plane. Euclidean affine geometry cor-
responds to the subgroup which leaves a specified line at infinity invariant. Intuitively, we
take the points which are not on that line to be the “finite points”, so that an affine trans-
formation is linear and maps all finite points to finite points. Euclidean similarity geometry
corresponds to the subgroup which leaves the line at infinity invariant together with a spec-
ified absolute involution of that line. Intuitively it is affine and preserves angles. Euclidean
congruence geometry, and hyperbolic, and spherical geometries correspond to other sub-
groups In this way the points of Euclidean, hyperbolic, and spherical plane geometry can
all be taken to be (among) the points of the projective plane.
This was a very pretty link between projective geometry and several kinds of Euclidean
geometry. And, far beyond a mere logical consistency proof, this method gave hyperbolic
and spherical geometries great legitimacy by linking them to projective geometry. Marquis
cites many sources discussing this.
Klein takes for granted that a “manifoldness” is a projective space—so the geometries
are all subsets of projective spaces (of any dimension). This is like the assumption common
well into the 20th century that differential manifolds are subsets of real coordinate spaces
Rn. He stresses that the transformation groups, though, need not be contained in the linear
groups naturally associated to projective spaces. This is vital to Marquis’s topic.
Klein discusses how analysis situs goes beyond linear transformations to all continuous
transformations. He also considers more complicated contact transformations. Only the
simplest kind of those is much known today, namely the dualities in projective geometry
which transforms points to higher dimensional subspaces and vice versa. These more gen-
eral geometries have transformation groups so different from the projective geometries that
Klein has little to say about them.
He specifically urges geometers to go beyond the projective viewpoint (and build a
greater unity with physics) by working “the rich mine of mathematical truths brought to
light by the theory of the curvature of surfaces” [1893, p. 244] and he mentions Lie’s pro-
gress on related problems. But Lie used a local notion of transformation, which does not
transform an entire space into itself, but only a part of it. In the 20th century Élie Cartan
would organize and extend this a very great deal and even his methods would not work for
spaces with irregularly non-constant curvature. Those spaces generally have no non-trivial
symmetries even locally because the curvature is not even locally symmetric.
Marquis relates all of this to category theory in several ways. Eilenberg and Mac Lane’s
claim is certainly true on its face. Where Klein would study a single geometric space by its
“group of transformations” to itself, they would study a family of objects (say, the class of
all Abelian groups, or of all topological spaces) by the “algebra of mappings” between them
(quoted on p. 9). But are these two projects really so similar? Klein really succeeded only
with the very special case of linear transformation groups acting on (subsets of) projective
spaces, which is remote from Eilenberg and Mac Lane’s stated concerns.
Eilenberg and Mac Lane looked not at one space at a time and its transformations to
itself; but at the category of all spaces (of any one kind) at once and all the transformations
among them. And, crucially, Klein took transformations to be invertible or as we now say
isomorphic—essentially what was called “change of coordinates.” Klein explicitly took it
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sense. Eilenberg and Mac Lane relied on transformations or mappings between explicitly
quite different spaces—for example a map from the line to the circle which wraps the line
infinitely many times around the circle. The line and the circle are in no relevant sense the
same space.
Much further, Eilenberg and Mac Lane focused on “transformations” from one entire
category to another, called functors. Klein did in fact use analogous group homomorphisms
from the transformation group of one space to that of another. If we use categorical hind-
sight then we will say he could hardly avoid doing that. It was implicit in his reasoning,
though only the case of one group being included in another got explicit attention.
Yet the broader idea was implicit, and Klein explicitly called for further advances. He
succeeded as he intended at emphasizing programs productive in his own time which would
continue on far beyond anything imaginable then. His overall thought cohered with actual
trends in early 20th century pure mathematics and in physics so that Cartan and others had
Klein’s program in mind as they went far beyond the program’s own framework and this is
still going on today. Marquis shows how this led to standard geometric techniques today
whereby every closed normal subgroup of any Lie group defines a space—including Klein’s
spaces as very special cases. Marquis discusses the concepts notably in his twin sections
“Why a Transformation Group is Not Quite Enough” and “But Then Again, why a Group
is Enough,” and in a section on philosophical concepts of supervenience and reduction. He
well says “This progression from ‘concrete’ representations to abstract structures will
accompany us throughout, for it is a key feature of the whole of 20th century mathematics”
(p. 30). It remains key a good decade into the 21st.
Marquis’s book is well read together with Krömer [2007]. They have somewhat comple-
mentary time ranges as Marquis has more on the 19th and early 20th century background,
and on recent ideas of higher dimensional categories, while Krömer has more on mid-20th
century topology and especially Grothendieck. Marquis focusses more on philosophic
aspects of geometrization and notions of identity versus isomorphism and equivalence.
Krömer uses more archival research into unpublished sources and his philosophy is more
aimed at pragmatism and issues of philosophy of science. Both make good use of interviews
with living sources. Both cover many viewpoints on current debate over categorical foun-
dations for mathematics.
Much of this book builds towards the account of higher dimensional categories. A cate-
gory can be seen as a network of (one dimensional) arrows linking (zero dimensional)
points. This technically useful description is used intuitively throughout the literature of
pure category theory and applications. A 2-category further has 2-cells between arrows,
visualized as surfaces with the arrows as edges. Higher dimensional categories may have
ðn þ 1Þ-cells going between n-cells for any n 2 N. Non-trivial examples occur throughout
category theory and are central to much recent homotopy theory in topology. They make
an intriguing link of category theory with geometry, but all require more explanation than
we will give here.
There is a crucial difference in that category theory leads to strict n-categories while the
rising connections with topology use weak n-categories. There is a long-established stan-
dard definition of the strict case. There is so far no accepted definition of weak n-category.
There are many candidates. With time the best of them may be selected and unified; or truly
different candidates may prove best for different purposes. Marquis describes the mathe-
matical motives. He argues that the weak n-categorical viewpoint may lead to replacing
the notions of equality or identity by weaker notions of isomorphism of objects (and thus
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ulates on ways this could, or should, affect thinking about categorical foundations for
mathematics. But these arguments remain somewhat up in the air for now, because both
“a proper characterization of the so-called weak n-categories” and “a proper axiomatiza-
tion” of a foundation for mathematics in these terms “are still open problems at the
moment of writing” (p. 7).
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